Attacks on hash functions and applications by Stevens, Marc Martinus Jacobus
 
Cover Page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/19093 holds various files of this Leiden University 
dissertation. 
 
Author: Stevens, Marc Martinus Jacobus 
Title: Attacks on hash functions and applications 
Issue Date: 2012-06-19 
Stellingen
bij het proefschrift
Attacks on Hash Functions
and Applications
door Marc Stevens
1. Constructing a rogue Certiﬁcation Authority certiﬁcate as described
in Chapter 4.2 would cost only around 2700 USD, of which 2000 USD
is spent on renting publicly available computing power for one day at
Amazon EC2 and 700 USD on buying certiﬁcates. This is signiﬁcantly
less than the ﬁnancial damage malicious parties can cause with such a
rogue Certiﬁcation Authority certiﬁcate within the short amount of time
before their attack is detected.
Chapter 4 of this thesis
2. To construct a collision attack that is faster than a brute-force attack,
it is not enough to have a diﬀerential path with high success probability
over steps K; : : : ; S   1, i.e., all steps after the ﬁrst K steps that use the
message block bits exactly once. It is also necessary that the diﬀerences
WK ; : : : ; WS 1 assumed by the diﬀerential path can eﬃciently be ob-
tained.
Chapter 5 of this thesis
3. There exists an eﬃcient tunnel for MD5 that aﬀects Q26; : : : ; Q64 using
simultaneous changes in Q3[b] and Q14[b] and corrections in m2, m3, m6,
m13 and m14, which is an improvement over tunnels T1; : : : ; T8 (see p. 99).
Chapter 6 of this thesis
4. The total complexity of the identical-preﬁx collision attack for SHA-1
given in Section 7.6 is equivalent to approximately 261 SHA-1 compres-
sions.
Chapter 7 of this thesis
5. To be secure against collision attacks on MD5 or SHA-1, using collision
detection results in a signiﬁcantly higher runtime complexity compared to
using a fast secure alternative such as SHA-2-256.
Chapter 8 of this thesis
6. There exists a collision attack on the compression function of MD5 that
for given IHVin computes message blocks M and M 0 such that
MD5Compress(IHVin;M) = MD5Compress(IHVin;M 0)
with an average complexity equivalent to about 249:8 calls to MD5Compress.
This compression function attack directly constitutes an identical-preﬁx
collision attack on MD5 resulting in 512-bit colliding messages.
[Ste12]
7. Hash functions are among the main cryptographic workhorses and used
in many ways in security applications. However, current hash function
standards often lack standardized secure extensions for common use cases
such as randomized/keyed hashing. It is desirable that future hash func-
tion standards include such secure extensions.
8. In practice a “provably secure” designed cryptographic primitive is not
always preferable over an ad-hoc designed cryptographic primitive.
9. Given a ﬁeld F2l of characteristic two, let C be a smooth hyperelliptic
curve of genus two over F2l . In the Jacobian G = J(C), computing the
double P + P of a point P 2 G can be done signiﬁcantly faster than
computing an arbitrary sum P +Q of points P;Q 2 G and P 6= Q.
[LS04]
10. Replacing an insecure cryptographic primitive with a secure alternative
in practice often requires a lot of eﬀort, coordination and in particular time.
Hence, when a signiﬁcant weakness is found in a cryptographic primitive
and security is a top priority, it is ill advised to wait with replacing the
weak primitive with a secure alternative until realistic attacks appear.
11. An old wisdom dictates that “attacks always get better; they never
get worse” (presumably originated with the US National Security Agency).
However, this does not always hold for the generally perceived best attack
complexity.
12. A good heuristic towards solving a problem is that exact methods lead
to better (if not optimal) solutions compared to heuristic methods.
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